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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RAE ADAMSON, BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
-vs- Appellate Case No. 20010516-CA 
Court of Appeals No. 20010516-CA 
District Court No. 874904654 
RANAE ADAMSON, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT (hereinafter "Petitioner" or "husband") submits the following 
as his brief in the above matter: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order herein, which is the Order Denying 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce ("Order Denying Petition to Modify") in the trial court, and 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals dated December 12, 2003, is vested in the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rules 3 and 4, and Utah Code 
Annotated, §78-2-2, and by reason of a grant of certiorari herein. 
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NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
The matter below is a proceeding to modify a decree of divorce, and the orders 
appealed from are the Order Denying Petition to Modify in the trial court, and the opinion of the 
Utah Court of Appeals thereon. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issue is presented on appeal: For purposes of modifying Respondent's 
("wife's") alimony award, did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding Petitioner's impending 
retirement was not a substantial material change of circumstances not foreseeable at the time 
of the divorce? Was the husband's claim ripe for consideration? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statute may dispose of the issue outlined above: Section 30-3-5(7)(g)(i) 
(1998 and Supp. 2001). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Section 30-3-5(7)(g)(i) (1998 & Supp 2001) gives a trial court "continuing jurisdiction to 
make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based upon a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce." 
"The determination of the trial court that there [has or has not] been a substantial 
change of circumstances is presumed valid." Bolligerv. Bolliger 997 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah App. 
2000). The appellate court reviews "the ruling under an abuse of discretion standard." id. 
However, the Utah Court of Appeals found that the matter is not ripe for consideration. This is 
a matter of law, may rise to the level of constitutional law, and should be granted de novo 
review here. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order denying a petition to modify an alimony award. The 
alimony award had been granted in a divorce decree twelve years prior to the modification trial. 
The case arose in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
The parties were divorced pursuant to a decree entered in 1989. Ten years later, because 
husband was reaching retirement age, he brought a petition to modify the alimony award on the 
grounds that his impending retirement was a substantial material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. The modification case was tried before the bench on 
April 17, 2001. The trial court rendered its decision on the record and, on May 18, 2001, 
entered the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Petition to Modify. See 
Exhibit "A." 
The trial court denied the petition because: 
[T]he rule that Judge Rigtrup [the judge who entered the divorce decree] made in 
the original divorce decree certainly contemplates retirement. If it didn't, [wife] 
would not have been awarded a percentage of [husband's] retirement. At the 
same time, it awards alimony that goes past age 65. That's clear, too. So I 
would surmise that Judge Rigtrup meant that the alimony payment should go on 
[sic] retirement. Judge Rigtrup obviously understood that Ms. Adamson was 
going to be totally unproductive. When the court says you can take the child 
support out of the equity in the home, that's a recognition that the person who 
should be the payer of the child support is never going to pay. 
Record, at 53, lines 5-16. 
Although the trial court found no substantial material change in circumstances, it went 
on to find that wife would be better off if alimony, in fact, were terminated. The trial court 
stated: 
[A]t the same time, if because of this ruling, [husband] decides not to retire, then 
I think [wife] ought to initiate discussions to figure out a way to trade his 
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retirement and the percentage he gets for the alimony that she's receiving, 
because as I've said, even though my ruling is that there is not a change in 
circumstances to warrant changing the alimony award in the petition, [wife] would 
be better off if there was. So (inaudible) ruling very much. It's sort of an 
unsatisfactory situation. 
MS. CORPORON: Your Honor-
THE COURT: I'm not over. I'm saying he should... he ought to be able to retire. 
I'm not ordering him to retire, and he can work as long as the 
State would let him work, and she'd be better off if he'd retire and 
she gave up the alimony. 
Record, at 53, lines 22-25, and at 54, lines 1-10. 
From this finding and ruling of the court below, husband appealed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the husband's petition in the trial court was 
not ripe for judicial determination, and therefore affirmed the trial judge's conclusion that u[t]here 
has not been a substantial and material change in circumstances warranting a modification of 
alimony." Specifically, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the issue of alimony modification 
was not an issue appropriate for appellate review because it allegedly was not "ripe." The Court 
of Appeals found that "ripeness occurs when 'a conflict over the application of a legal provision 
[has] sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between the 
parties thereto.'" The Court of Appeals rejected the husband's argument that his retirement was 
not merely speculative, but was in fact imminent under the circumstances. The Court of 
Appeals found that husband has no argument that there is a substantial and material change of 
circumstance under the facts of this case entitling him to a modification or termination of 
alimony because husband's entitlement to retire does not guarantee that he will, in fact, retire. 
From this decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, the Petitioner petitioned for a writ of 
certiorari to the above-entitled court, and was granted the opportunity for review in this Court 
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upon the granting of a writ of certiorari. See attached "order" from the Utah Supreme Court of 
State of Utah, See Exhibit "B." 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties to this action were husband and wife, but were divorced by a decree of 
divorce entered on February 9, 1989. See Exhibit "C." The original trial court awarded 
Respondent $200.00 per month in alimony. Decree of Divorce at para. 11. The entire 
reference to alimony contained in paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact reads as follows: 
Both parties to this action are able-bodied and employable. However, Defendant 
[wife] is in need of support. It is reasonable, just and proper that Plaintiff 
[husband] be ordered to pay to Defendant the sum of Two Hundred Dollars 
($200.00) per month, as and for alimony, commencing with the month of 
February 1989, and continuing until the death of the Plaintiff or Defendant, or 
until Defendant's remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first occurs, or until 
further order of this court. This award of alimony is subject to review by the court 
on July 7, 1989 at 8:30 a.m. before the assigned judge. 
The original trial court also divided Petitioner's retirement benefits. The entire reference 
to retirement benefits is contained in the Findings of Fact at paragraph 12, as follows: 
Plaintiff has acquired an interest in a retirement plan through his employment 
with the State of Utah, which should be divided equally between the parties, 
according to the Woodward Formula, and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
should issue from this Court. 
Petitioner brought his petition to modify here in issue because he was reaching 
retirement age and wanted to retire. By the time of trial, he had reached retirement age. The 
trial court found at paragraph 8 of its Findings now on appeal: 
The Petitioner was 65 years of age at the time of trial in this action and 
will achieve the age of 66 years within approximately one month from the date of 
trial herein. 
Based upon the court's observations of the Petitioner at trial, his demeanor and 
appearance, and based upon this court's finding that there is a cultural expectation in 
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our society that persons can retire from full-time employment at the age of 65, the court 
finds that it is reasonable, just and proper that the Petitioner retire at this time. 
The Petitioner has not retired from his employment, to date, despite his 
eligibility to do so, because he alleges he is concerned that the obligation to pay 
alimony will continue past his retirement, and he is concerned that he will be 
unable to meet his expenses on a reduced income from retirement, if the 
alimony obligation continues. This was the Petitioner's stated purpose for 
bringing his petition to modify the alimony obligation to terminate that obligation. 
Even though the trial court did not find Petitioner's impending retirement was a 
substantial material change in circumstances, the trial court did enter numerous findings of fact 
concerning Respondent's needs and Petitioner's ability to pay. See Order Denying Petition at 
paras. 11-19. The trial court included among its findings calculations of the income 
Respondent would receive from Social Security benefits to which she was entitled already, but 
for which she had not yet applied; and calculations of the income Respondent would receive 
from Petitioner's retirement, if Petitioner did retire, id. Given the much more favorable financial 
situation Respondent would realize if Petitioner retired, the trial court concluded: 
The Respondent's refusal to waive further alimony in this case, in order to induce 
the Petitioner to retire, so that she can receive his retirement benefits which are 
greater than the alimony, is not reasonable in the premises. However, the court 
cannot require the parties to behave reasonably in settlement discussions. 
id. at 20. On the record at the conclusion of trial, the trial court insisted Respondent would be 
better off if Petitioner retired and stopped paying alimony. The trial court stated: 
[Respondent's] better off if [Petitioner] retires, though. [Petitioner's counsel] is 
right. [Respondent] is going to qualify for social security, and that's going to 
happen whether he retires or not, but her percentage of his retirement should be 
close to two-and-a-half, three times the amount of alimony that she receives 
under the alimony [sic]. So, if I show that they haven't shown a material change 
in circumstances and the Petition is denied, and he chooses to continue working 
because of that, she's in worse shape than she is if he retires, even if I say he 
doesn't have to pay alimony anymore. The numbers can't be argued with. 
Record at 51, lines 5-14. 
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The trial court denied Petitioner's petition for the following reasons: 
[T]he rule that Judge Rigtrup made in the original divorce decree certainly 
contemplates retirement. If it didn't, [Respondent] would not have been 
awarded a percentage of [Petitioner's] retirement. At the same time, it awards 
alimony that goes past age 65. That's clear, too. So I would surmise that Judge 
Rigtrup meant that the alimony payment should go on [sic] retirement. 
Record, at 53, lines 5-16. Regarding the trial court's reasons for denying the petition, the single 
finding of fact that addresses the trial court's reasons states: 
The [original trail court] did not order initially that alimony would terminate upon 
the Petitioner's retirement, or at any other time, other than the Petitioner's death 
or Respondent's death, remarriage or cohabitation, and from this, this court 
concludes that the trial court originally did not intend alimony ever to terminate. 
Order Denying Petition to Modify at para. 23. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Petitioner sought the trial court's continuing jurisdiction to modify the alimony award on 
the grounds that his impending retirement was a substantial material change in circumstances 
not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
The trial court found that Petitioner's impending retirement was not a substantial 
material change in circumstances. Specifically, the trial court found that the original trial court 
had awarded "permanent alimony" which would continue beyond Petitioner's attaining the age 
of 65; and second, the original trial court had divided Petitioner's retirement benefits between 
the parties. From these two facts, the modification court concluded that the original trial court 
must have foreseen Petitioner's retirement. 
The theory of the modification court seems to go like this: 1) If the original trial court had 
Ointended alimony ever to end, it would not have entered an alimony award that continued 
indefinitely, ending only when a party died or remarried; and 2) the original trial court must have 
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foreseen Petitioner's retirement because, if the original trial court had not foreseen Petitioner's 
retirement, it could not have divided Petitioner's retirement benefits. 
Two cases from the Court of Appeals are directly on point in holding that the 
foreseeability of a parties' retirement, in the sense that the original trial court considered 
retirement in making its alimony award, cannot be inferred from the two facts stated above. 
Bolliqer v. Bolliqer, 997 P.2d 903 (Utah App. 2000), held that a trial court, knowing only that an 
award of alimony was permanent, could not infer that, at the time of divorce, the original trial 
court contemplated a parties' retirement in making its alimony award. See id. at 908. In 
addition, concerning whether a trial court made adequate findings that it foresaw a parties' 
retirement in making an original alimony award, Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 
1993), held that a trial court, in simply allocating retirement benefits between the parties, did not 
make sufficient findings to inform a later trial court, when faced with a petition to modify, 
whether the original trial court considered retirement in its alimony award or not. The court in 
Johnson further held it to be against public policy to have trial courts making their alimony 
awards, trying to divine what original trial court's did or did not contemplate many years earlier, 
id. at 253. 
Given the case law history in Bolliqer, supra, and Johnson, supra, the trial court abused 
its discretion in finding that there was not a substantial and material change in circumstances 
warranting a modification of alimony. 
Further, the Utah Court of Appeals erred in finding that this entire issue was not ripe for 
review at the time of the modification trial. The analysis of the Court of Appeals creates too 
strict a standard for divorced parties seeking modifications of their decrees of divorce. The 
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correct standard is found in the analysis of Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P2d. 741 (Utah App. 
1991), which stands for the proposition that ripeness occurs when a conflict over the application 
of a legal provision has sharpened into an "actual or imminent" clash of legal rights and 
obligations between the parties. Here, where husband asked the court to modify his alimony 
based upon his prospective retirement, the appellate court below should have found an 
imminent clash of legal rights existed. 
ARGUMENT 
PETITIONER'S PENDING RETIREMENT WAS A SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES NOT FORESEEN AT THE TIME OF THE PARTIES' 
DIVORCE, AND THIS ISSUE WAS RIPE FOR DETERMINATION IN THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
POINT I. SUMMARY OF THE MODIFICATION ISSUE. 
Petitioner was almost 66 years old when his petition to modify came to trial. The decree 
of divorce was then twelve years old. Based upon its assessment of Petitioner, the court found 
it to be "reasonable, just and proper" that Petitioner retire. Order Denying Petition at para. 9. 
The trial court further found that Petitioner's income would be reduced if he retired, and that he 
could not afford to retire if his obligation to pay alimony continued, id. at 16. Despite this, the 
trial court concluded Petitioner's retirement was not a substantial material change of 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce. Record, at 54, lines 1-5. Instead, the trial 
court found that the original trial court fid foresee Petitioner's retirement in entering the decree 
in 1989. Record, at 53, lines 5-6. 
A trial court has continuing jurisdiction over alimony awards. However, in order to 
invoke the court's continuing jurisdiction, a petitioner must show there has been a substantial 
material change of circumstance not foreseeable at the time of divorce. §30-3-5(7)(g)(i), Utah 
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Code Ann. (1998 & Supp. 2001) (which provides "the court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change 
in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce"), id. 
In the instant case, the trial court found that because the original trial court 
contemplated Petitioner's retirement, Petitioner's retirement was foreseeable at the time of 
divorce. Thus, the court concluded it could not make a new order terminating alimony. 
This Court reviews the trial court's determination whether there has not been a 
substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce under an 
abuse of discretion standard. Bolligerv. Bolliqer, 997 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah App. 2000); Johnson 
v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App. 1993). 
The trial court abused its discretion in finding Petitioner's retirement was an event 
contemplated at the time of the parties' divorce. 
A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Finding that, Simply 
Because the Divorce Decree Made a "Permanent Alimony" Award, 
Which Did Not Specify a Particular Termination Date, the Divorce 
Decree Contemplated Petitioner's Retirement. 
The trial court based its finding of foreseeability on the fact that the original trial court 
awarded "permanent alimony." The alimony award contained in the divorce decree continued 
beyond Petitioner's attaining the age of 65, terminating only when one or the other party died or 
remarried. Record, at 53, lines 5-16. From the mere "permanency" of the alimony award, the 
trial court concluded that the original trial court intended alimony to continue beyond Petitioner's 
retirement; and, thus, the original trial court foresaw Petitioner's retirement in making its 
alimony award. 
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The Bolliger case is directly on point. 997 P.2d 903. In Bolliger the parties divorced 
pursuant to a decree entered in 1987. Under the decree, Mrs. Bolliger was awarded $685 per 
month alimony from April 1987, onward, and she was awarded one-half of the military pension 
Mr. Bolliger was then receiving. The alimony award would be payable to Mrs. Bolliger "so long 
as she lives with the exception that [it would] cease upon [Mrs. Bolliger's] remarriage, 
cohabitation, or death." Bolliger 997 P.2d at 905. It is interesting to note that both the Bolliger 
case and the instant case come from the same court and the same trial judge. 
Ten years after the entry of the divorce decree, Mr. Bolliger petitioned the court to 
modify the alimony award because he faced unexpected retirement from his job, and because 
Mrs. Bolliger had begun receiving Social Security. Mr. Bolliger argued that neither his forced 
retirement nor Mrs. Bolliger's receipt of Social Security were anticipated by the divorce decree 
or were considered in calculating the amount of Mrs. Bolliger's alimony award. Mrs. Bolliger 
argued that both events were anticipated by the decree, jd. at 906. 
The trial court found that Mr. Bolliger's retirement and Mrs. Bolliger's receipt of Social 
Security were foreseeable events. And, like the trial court in the instant case, the Bolliger trial 
court found that the parties' agreement to a permanent alimony award evinced the 
foreseeability both of Mr. Bolliger's retirement and of Mrs. Bolliger's receipt of social security, 
id. at 908. 
In holding that the Bolliger trial court had abused its discretion in finding the events 
foreseeable or contemplated, the Court of Appeals reiterated its former articulation of what is 
meant by "contemplated" in a divorce decree. The court said: 
The fact that the parties may have anticipated [a substantial material change in 
circumstances] in their own minds or in their discussions does not mean that the 
12 
decree itself contemplates the change. In order for a material change in 
circumstances to be contemplated in a divorce decree there must be evidence, 
preferably in the form of a provision in the decree itself, that the trial court 
anticipated the specific change, id. at 906 (quoting Durfee vs. Durfee, 796 P.2d 
713, 716 (Utah App. 1990). id. at 906. 
The Bolliger court continued: 
Accordingly, if both the divorce decree and the record are bereft of any reference 
to the changed circumstance at issue in the petition to modify, then the 
subsequent changed circumstances was not contemplated in the original divorce 
decree, id. (Emphasis added). 
The Bolliger appellate court concluded that "a party's retirement or receipt of Social 
Security, unless expressly foreseen at the time of the divorce, may amount to a substantial and 
material change of circumstances entitling a petitioner to a determination of whether the 
alimony should be modified." id. at 908. The Bolliger appellate court held that "[Mr. Bolliger's] 
forced retirement and resulting income reduction and [Mrs. Bolliger's] receipt of social security 
benefits were substantial material changes of circumstances not foreseen at the time of 
divorce. Thus the [BoNiger] trial court abused its discretion when it denied [Mr. Bolliger's] 
Petition to Modify Alimony on that basis." id. 
Like the trial court in the instant case, the Bolliger trial court found evidence of the 
foreseeability of retirement and social security in the "permanent" nature of the alimony award. 
The Court of Appeals in Bolliger assumed the Bolliger trial court determined "neither the parties 
nor the court could modify a permanent alimony award." However, "even if permanent alimony 
is awarded, a later material change of circumstances not foreseen at the time of divorce can 
provide grounds for modifying the permanent alimony upon appropriate petition." id. at 908 
(citing Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah App. 1990)). Consequently, the Court of 
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Appeals held that the trial court's denial of Mr. Bolliger's petition to modify on the basis that the 
alimony award was permanent, was an abuse of discretion, id. 
This Court should find the Bollinger analysis persuasive. In the instant case, the trial 
court erroneously found that the award of "permanent alimony"—continuing, as it did, beyond 
the date of Petitioner's retirement—expressly indicated that the original trial court foresaw these 
events. Record, at 53, lines 5-11. However, the mere "permanency" of alimony, by itself, does 
not give any indication that the original trial court contemplated retirement at the time of divorce. 
Bolliger, supra. 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Finding that, Because the 
Divorce Decree Allocated Petitioner's Retirement Benefits, the 
Divorce Decree Contemplated Petitioner's Retirement. 
The second reason the trial court gave for not finding Petitioner's retirement to be a 
substantial material change of circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce was that 
the divorce decree allocated Petitioner's retirement benefits. Because retirement was 
mentioned in the decree, the court below concluded the original trial court must have 
contemplated Petitioner's eventual retirement. Record, at 53, lines 6-8. 
Regarding this finding, the analysis in Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 
1993) is on point. In that case, the trial court awarded one-half of the parties' pension plan to 
each party. 
Even though the trial court allocated the parties' retirement benefits, Mr. Johnson 
claimed the trial court abused its discretion by not contemplating in its alimony award the 
retirement benefits Mrs. Johnson would receive in the future. The Johnson court agreed, jd. at 
251. The Johnson court stated, "[i]n awarding alimony, the trial court made no findings with 
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regard to Mrs. Johnson's future ability to withdraw income from the pension plan, and how this 
additional income would affect her financial condition and her ability to provide for her own 
needs." id. at 253. The Johnson court anticipated the instant trial court's analysis regarding 
foreseeability. It pointed out: 
Since the trial court in the instant case [Johnson] divided the pension plan 
between the parties, it was cognizant of Mrs. Johnson's ability to receive 
additional income in the future that would alter her financial condition and needs. 
Thus . . . Mrs. Johnson could argue that her receipt of retirement benefits was an 
anticipated event and the trial court considered it when making the alimony 
award. Therefore, Mrs. Johnson's receipt of retirement benefits might not be 
considered a material change of circumstances. Jd. 
In refuting this argument that appellate court stated: 
We do not believe it makes for good law or sound policy to have parties arguing 
years after the fact over what a trial court may or may not have considered when 
making an alimony award. ]d. 
This is precisely the kind of speculation in which the trial court in the instant case has 
indulged. The trial court here searched for language which might be construed as expressly 
indicating what the original trial court may have considered in making its alimony award. But, 
the court in Johnson stated that even though the trial court allocated the parties' retirement 
benefits, that trial court "failfed] to expressly indicate whether the future retirement benefits 
were considered in making the alimony award.'1 Jd. at 254. Therefore, the Johnson appellate 
court held the trial court's findings to be inadequate and remanded the case back to the trial 
court for further findings. Id. Because the trial court's findings in Johnson were inadequate to 
indicate whether the trial court had considered future retirement in making its alimony award, a 
future trial court, ruling on a petition to modify alimony, would have insufficient evidence to 
conclude that the earlier trial court had contemplated retirement in its alimony award. See Id. 
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Here, this court should accept the analysis in Johnson, and hold the original trial court's 
mere allocation of retirement benefits in this case, without an express indication by it that it had 
considered retirement in making its alimony award, did not give the instant trial court sufficient 
evidence to conclude that the original trial court contemplated retirement. Consequently, to the 
extent that the lower court based its foreseeability determination upon the original trial court's 
allocation of retirement benefits, the court below abused its discretion. See Id. 
Therefore, because the original trial court did not foresee retirement, and did not 
expressly incorporate into the Decree, the effect of retirement on alimony, the trial court abused 
its discretion in not finding Petitioner's retirement to be a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce. 
POINT 2. HUSBAND'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION IS RIPE FOR DECISION 
BECAUSE IT HAS RIPENED INTO AN IMMINENT CLASH OF LEGAL 
RIGHTS. 
A. Overview. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the Court of Appeals below cited Adelman v. Adelman, 
815 P.2d 741, 744 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) for the proposition that ripeness occurs when a conflict 
over the application of a legal provision has sharpened into an "actual or imminent" clash of 
legal rights and obligations between the parties. Because husband asked the court to modify 
his alimony based upon his prospective retirement, the Court of Appeals concluded no actual or 
imminent clash of legal rights existed. 
The Court found that, if husband had retired, the clash of legal rights between the 
parties would be "actual." A better view is that a conflict can be ripe for adjudication when a 
clash of rights and obligations is "imminent," as well as when the clash is "actual." In the 
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instant case, husband's retirement was imminent at trial, thus the modification of alimony was 
ripe for decision. 
B. Husband's Petition to Modify Is Ripe Because No Further Factual 
Development Will Clarify the Issue and Because Husband Will Suffer 
Harm from the Court's Withholding of its Consideration. 
The United States Supreme Court analyzes ripeness in a number of decisions. The 
Court said, "[rjipeness is peculiarly a question of timing." Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 
568, 580, 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3332; 87 L. Ed. 2d 409, 419 (1985) (citing Regional Rail 
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140, 95 S. Ct. 335, 357, 42 L. Ed. 2d 320, 351 
(1974)). "Its basic rationale is to prevent courts, through premature adjudication, from 
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements." Thomas, 473 U.S. at 580 (citing Abbott 
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L Ed. 2d 681, 691 
(1967)). Ripeness is two-fold. It turns on "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision" and 
"the hardship to the parties of withholding court considerations." Abbott, 387 U.S. at 149. 
Whether an issue is fit for judicial decision relates to whether further factual 
development will clarify the issue presented. Cf. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 581 (the presence of a 
legal issue made further factual development unnecessary). In the instant case, the trial court 
did not need additional facts about the parties' financial condition to draw firm conclusions 
about the effect of husband's retirement. The trial court found that appellee would be better off 
financially if husband retired. No additional factual development will clarify the issue of whether 
husband's retirement is a substantial and material change of circumstances. 
As the court pointed out in its Memorandum Decision, harm to husband does not 
address directly the threshold question of substantial and material change of circumstances. 
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However, harm to husband due to the court's withholding of its consideration does factor into 
the ripeness issue. Abbott, 387 U.S. at 149. Abbott concerned government agency 
interpretation of a drug labeling statute. Agency action exposed petitioners to sanctions if they 
failed to comply with certain labeling requirements. Petitioners sued for declaratory relief. The 
government argued that the issue was not ripe because the agency action was not final. The 
Court disagreed, finding the impact of the regulations to be direct and immediate, id. at 152. 
The Court found the regulation at issue put the petitioners in a dilemma: either they changed 
their promotional material, or they continued with the materials they presently used and risked 
prosecution. Jd. at 152-54. Although, the agency had not actually sanctioned petitioners, the 
harm faced by the petitioners due to the expense and business risk from, for example, bad 
publicity; combined with the needlessness of additional factual development, warranted judicial 
review, jd. at 152-54. 
In the instant case, this Court need not develop additional facts. But, husband will suffer 
harm if he must actually retire, while at the same time continuing to pay the alimony his 
retirement renders him unable to afford. Just as in Abbott, he must retire and risk financial 
hardship and a contempt of court finding, before he knows what will happen to him. 
C. The Utah Supreme Court Has Decided a Petition to Modify Based 
upon an Imminent Change in Circumstances. 
In its Memorandum Decision, The Court of Appeals seems most concerned that a ruling 
terminating alimony could not compel husband actually to retire. The choice to retire remains 
with husband, and until husband does in fact retire, there has been no substantial and material 
change of circumstances—in other words, circumstances have not changed at all. 
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However, the Utah Supreme Court has not previously required that a substantial and 
material change of circumstances actually occur before the court can adjudicate a modification. 
In Becker v. Becker. 694 P.2d 608 (1984), this Court found a substantial and material change of 
circumstances warranting a modification, based upon an imminent change of circumstances. In 
Becker, the divorce decree awarded custody of the parties' children to respondent. Upon 
learning that respondent planned to move out-of-state with the children in the future, petitioner 
petitioned the trial court for a modification of custody, jd. at 609. That petition was heard on 
the merits. If the Utah Supreme Court in Becker had followed the Court of Appeals' reasoning 
in the instant case, petitioner's petition to modify should have been dismissed on ripeness 
grounds. Until respondent actually moved the children out-of-state, petitioner should have been 
unable to allege a substantial and material change of circumstances. 
However, this Court in Becker upheld the trial court's decision that respondent's 
impending move was material to visitation. In other words, the court found respondent's 
impending move to another state was a substantial change in circumstances warranting a 
modification of the parties' divorce decree. Jd. at 609-11. In its decision, the court never 
discussed whether or not respondent ever actually moved; yet the court did not dismiss the 
case on ripeness grounds. Respondent had not moved at the time petitioner filed her petition 
to modify; and throughout its decision, the court did not emphasize a move had occurred. It is 
not clear from the opinion whether respondent ever moved at all. However, the Utah Supreme 
Court still found a substantial and material change of circumstances had occurred without 
finding petitioner's petition to have been unripe. 
19 
The Becker decision was possible because ripeness does not depend exclusively on an 
"actual" clash of legal rights. A conflict that has sharpened into an "imminent" clash of legal 
rights and obligations also is ripe for adjudication, as the Court of Appeals found in its 
conflicting decision in Adelman, supra. 
D. The Court Can Easily Fashion an Order Which Terminates Husband's 
Alimony When He Retires. 
The Court of Appeals was concerned that, if the trial court were to find husband's 
petition for modification to be ripe for decision, and then terminate husband's alimony, husband 
might simply not retire. Thus, supposedly nothing could prevent husband from defrauding both 
Wife and the court. However, decrees of divorce in general, and alimony awards in particular, 
commonly contain contingent provisions. For example, decrees often make payment of house 
equity contingent upon future contingencies, such as children achieving majority or a spouse 
ceasing to use a house as a primary residence. A spouse may be required to exercise a stock 
option if a stock ever reaches a particular strike price. Some of these contingencies are even 
subject to disagreement and factual dispute (such as whether a house is or is not a "primary 
residence"); yet these contingencies are routinely included in divorce decrees and routinely 
enforced. In fact, the alimony award in the present case terminates upon contingencies of 
wife's remarriage or cohabitation, or upon the death of either party. Under the ripeness 
doctrine, husband's impending retirement is a substantial and material change in circumstances 
now warranting the termination of husband's alimony obligation; and the court can fashion an 
order that will not terminate husband's alimony obligation until he retires. The order can state: 
"Upon husband's retirement from employment, husband's obligation to pay alimony to Wife 
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terminates immediately and automatically." If husband does not retire, his alimony does not 
terminate. Only when he retires will husband's alimony obligation terminate. 
POINT 3. THE ENTIRE JUDICIAL HISTORY IN THIS CASE IGNORES THE 
REALITY OF ALIMONY LAW EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE 
ORIGINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
The finding of the Court of Appeals and the original trial court that the alimony award is 
"permanent," and thus should not be modified, is fundamentally flawed. It is worth noting that at 
the time of the parties' original Divorce Decree (1989), Utah Code Annotated, §30-3-5(8), had 
not been adopted stating that an award of alimony was generally limited by the number of years 
the parties had been married. Thus, it was common at that time forjudges to make awards of 
alimony "permanent" when what they really meant was that the facts merited awarding more 
than "temporary" alimony. (See Hiqlev v. Hiqlev. 626 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983). 
Leading case law in this area is Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). As was 
stated in Jones, "the trial court has broad latitude in such matters [payment of alimony], and 
orders distributing property and setting alimony will not be lightly disturbed." Id. at 1075, citing 
Hiqlev v. Hiqlev. 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983); Doritv v. Doritv. 645 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982); 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). 
In Jones, the husband and wife had been married for twenty years during which time the 
wife had been primarily a stay-at-home wife and had developed a few marketable job skills. 
The husband worked and earned approximately $90,000.00 annually. The trial court entered 
an award of alimony granting the wife monthly alimony of $1,000.00 for five years, $750.00 for 
five additional years and $500.00 per month thereafter. The appellate court found that the trial 
court had wholly failed to follow the standards as outlined in English v. English, 565 P.2d at 
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411, in fixing a reasonable award of alimony. Those factors are as follows: (1) financial 
conditions and needs of the wife; (2) the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for 
herself; and (3) the ability of the husband to provide support, id. at 411-12. Nowhere in that 
case does it mention the length of years of the marriage which was a substantive statutory 
provision. 
Further, the court, in Jones, found the arbitrary drops in alimony every five years to be 
an abuse of discretion when the court had failed to state a specific reason for doing so 
grounded in the facts of the case. Jones, at 1075. Therefore, when trial courts after 1985 
have made awards of alimony and stated that they were "permanent," they did not mean that 
the award of alimony was non-modifiable or non-reviewable. They simply meant that they had 
fixed no date certain upon which the alimony was to terminate, leaving that to the trial court to 
decide on a petition to modify, as was required by Jones. Thus, the argument here that the 
award of alimony is non-modifiable because it was called "permanent" is inaccurate and is not 
in keeping with Utah law in force at the time. Prior to the current enactment of Utah Code 
Annotated, §30-3-5(8), alimony of any limited number of years was called "temporary" alimony. 
See, generally, Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985); Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 
1986); Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1990); and Higlev v. Hiqlev. 676 P.2d 379 
(Utah 1983). 
The Higlev case is particularly illustrative of Petitioner's point, as it involves both 
temporary and permanent alimony. In that case, the court stated as follows: 
The trial court in this action granted a divorce to each party, 
divided their property almost equally, awarded the appellant 
temporary alimony for three years in an amount equivalent to the 
house and utilities payments and awarded the appellant 
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permanent alimony thereafter of $100 per month The appellant 
claims that the trial court abused its discretion in the granting of a 
divorce to Respondent and in the awarding of alimony Her first 
argument is without merit, but we reverse and remand that portion 
of the decree dealing with alimony This Court has set forth 
numerous criteria to be used in determining a reasonable alimony 
award In light of our precedents and the absence of a specific 
finding regarding the appellant's present or future ability to work, 
the trial court's $100 per month permanent alimony award was, in 
our opinion, an abuse of discretion Although we affirm the 
temporary alimony award, we reverse and remand the permanent 
alimony award for additional findings and possible modification 
id at 380 Respondent would have this Court believe that were the Higlev court to have also 
divided retirement assets, neither party could seek a modification of the alimony award after the 
retirement of either party simply because the court called the alimony award "permanent" 
In 1989, a trial judge could be summarily reversed for limiting the duration of alimony at 
all That is why the judge below, in 1989, did not terminate the alimony upon retirement 
Petitioner should not now be penalized because the law has evolved 
CONCLUSION 
Once it is determined a substantial material change of circumstances not foreseeable at 
the time of divorce has taken place, and that the matter is ripe for determination, a court must 
then consider at least the following factors in determining alimony (i) the financial condition and 
needs of the recipient spouse, (n) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to provide income, 
(in) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support, and (iv) the length of the marriage 
These factors apply not only to an initial award of alimony, but also to a redetermination of 
alimony during a modification proceeding The trial court must then make findings of fact based 
on these factors 997 P 2d at 909 (citing Williamson v Williamson, 983 P 2d 1103 (Utah App 
1999) (quoting §30-3-5(7)(a), Utah Code Ann (1998) (original omits other citations)) 
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In the instant case, the trial court made numerous findings concerning the factors cited 
above. Chiefly, the trial court found that, if Petitioner were to retire from his employment with 
the State of Utah; and were Respondent to receive social security disability, social security, and 
her portion of the Petitioner's retirement, Respondent would be in a significantly better 
economic position than she is at the present time, in which she receives social security disability 
benefits and alimony from the Petitioner in the sum of $200.00 per month. Order Denying 
Petition at para. 15. The court, further, expressly found it to be unreasonable for Respondent to 
refuse to waive alimony in order to induce Petitioner to retire; so that, in turn, Respondent could 
receive her percentage of Petitioner's retirement benefits, and be better off. jd. at 20. 
Given these findings, this Court need not remand the issue of alimony to anyone for a 
determination of a new alimony award pursuant to the factors. It is appropriate for the court in 
this case to enter an order terminating Petitioner's alimony obligation on appeal. To remand 
would waste the parties' time because the evidence is clear. Remand would serve only to 
delay the obvious result. 
The appellate court can exercise its equitable powers in modification cases to make 
findings of fact. See Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1978). In deciding remand is 
unnecessary, this Court would be supporting the factual findings of the trial court. 
In the instant case, had the trial court not abused its discretion, and had it correctly 
found that a substantial material change of circumstances had occurred, based on its findings 
of fact, the trial court would have terminated Petitioner's alimony in order to make Respondent 
"better off." Because the trial court already has made sufficient findings based on the evidence, 
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in this case the appellate court is in an equal position with the trial court. As a result, the Court 
of Appeals simply should terminate Petitioner's obligation to pay alimony. 
The trial court abused its discretion in not finding that Petitioner's retirement was a 
substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at time of the parties' divorce. In 
not finding a substantial material change in circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion 
in basing its decision on the fact that the original trial court awarded permanent alimony, and on 
the fact that the original trail court had allocated Petitioner's retirement benefit. However, the 
trial court made findings sufficient to justify terminating the alimony award on appeal. For these 
reasons, this court should reverse the trial court's refusal to invoke the continuing jurisdiction of 
the court to modify alimony; and this court should order the alimony award terminated, effective 
with the date of husband's trial, or, in the alternative, effective with the date he actually retires. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ day of June, 2003. 
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EXHIBIT "A 
MARYC CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801)328-1162 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
RAE ADAMSON, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER DENYING PETITION TO 
MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Petitioner, 
-vs- Civil No. 874904654DA 
RANAE ADAMSON, Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
Respondent. 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER having come before the court for trial on April 17, 
2001, Petitioner appearing in person and by and through his counsel of record, Mary C 
Corporon, Respondent appearing in person and by and through her counsel of record, 
Nathan Pace, the court having proceeded to hear the testimony of the parties and having 
received the exhibits of the parties, the court having heard the arguments of counsel and 
having reviewed the file and the pleadings contained therein, based thereon and for good 
cause appearing, the court now makes and enters the following-
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 The parties to this action were divorced by a decree of divorce entered in 
the above-entitled case in 1989 
2. At the time of the divorce of the parties, they had been married for a 
period of time between 17 and 18 years 
3. At the time of the divorce, the parties were the parents of minor children, 
all of whom have now achieved their majority However, the Petitioner 
testified and the court finds that the Petitioner has an adult son residing 
with him, and that the Petitioner is supporting the youngest child of these 
two parties in serving a religious mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints Pursuant to the decree of divorce, the Petitioner was 
awarded custody of the parties' children, subject to Respondent's rights of 
visitation The Respondent was ordered to pay child support for the 
parties' children of $75 00 per month per child, and the court, within the 
decree of divorce, specifically awarded Respondent an interest in the 
marital residence, but provided that her child support obligation would be 
set off against her home equity The court now finds that the trial court's 
prior determination to allow a set-off of child support against home equity 
constituted a finding by the court in the initial proceedings herein that the 
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Respondent could not be relied upon to pay support regularly to the 
parties' children. 
4. Pursuant to the decree of divorce, the Respondent was awarded alimony 
from the Petitioner in the sum of $200.00 per month. The Petitioner failed 
to pay any of his alimony timely, and a judgment for alimony arrearages 
was previously entered against him in the above-entitled court, in the sum 
of $16,900.00. The Petitioner paid that to Respondent in a lump sum to 
satisfy this judgment early in the year 2000. Respondent has testified and 
the court finds that the Respondent has expended the entirety of the lump 
sum payment for these alimony arrearages in repaying a loan to her 
brother and, in paying her utilities and her usual and routine living 
expenses. 
5. The Respondent did not pay any of her child support to the Petitioner, 
and eventually the entire amount of her child support was withheld from 
her equitable lien in the marital residence. As a result thereof, the 
Respondent's equitable lien in the residence was extinguished, and 
Respondent has no remaining interest in the equity in the marital 
residence. 
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6. The court finds that each party has been a "deadbeat," to some extent, 
the Petitioner for failure to pay alimony timely as previously ordered - the 
Respondent for failure to pay child support for the parties' minor children 
during their minority when they were in need of actual support. 
7. The court ordered the Petitioner to be taken into a holding cell to show 
him what the court can do with men who refuse to obey court orders. 
8. The Petitioner was 65 years of age at the time of trial in this action and 
will achieve the age of 66 years within approximately one month from the 
date of trial herein. 
9. Based upon the court's observations of the Petitioner at trial, his 
demeanor and appearance, and based upon this court's finding that there 
is a cultural expectation in our society that persons can retire from full-
time employment at the age of 65, the court finds that it is reasonable, just 
and proper that the Petitioner retire at this time. 
10. The Respondent herein is 58 years of age. The Respondent is not 
currently employed and has not been employed at all since the entry of 
the decree of divorce herein. The Respondent testified and the court 
finds that the Respondent did not ever make any application for any 
employment since the entry of the decree of divorce, as previously 
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ordered by the court. The Respondent has testified that she did not make 
application for employment because of her disability. The court finds that 
she has not endeavored to improve her situation. The court finds 
Respondent could have done so, if she had tried and if she had wanted 
to. 
11. The Respondent receives Social Security Disability benefits in the sum of 
$530.00 per month. The Respondent testified that she did not receive 
any other income from any other source, including food stamps or public 
assistance. However, the Respondent does receive the benefit of public 
housing, and her rent for her apartment is approximately $87.00 per 
month after the subsidy, for an apartment usually renting for $500.00 per 
month. 
12. The Respondent has reasonable and necessary living expenses, in 
addition to $87.00 per month for rent, of $150.00 per month for utilities, 
$250.00 per month for food and household supplies, and that she is 
entitled to incur reasonable expenses for such things as clothing or 
transportation. The Respondent does not have a motor vehicle nor does 
she have a telephone. She testified to the court from the witness stand 
that she is physically able to ride the city bus. 
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13. The Respondent was married to the Petitioner for a period of time in 
excess of 10 years and the Petitioner has now achieved the age of 65. 
Accordingly, the court finds that the Petitioner is entitled to obtain Social 
Security retirement benefits from the Social Security Administration, 
based upon the Petitioner's receiving Social Security retirement benefits. 
However, the Respondent has failed to make application for these 
benefits. The court finds that, were she to apply for Social Security 
retirement benefits, those benefits would be received by her in the sum of 
approximately $500.00 to $700.00 per month. 
14. The Respondent is entitled to receive a portion of the Petitioner's 
retirement benefits, based upon her marriage to the Petitioner during a 
period of time when he was also employed by his current employer, the 
State of Utah. The court finds that, therefore, the Respondent would be 
entitled to receive approximately 25% of the actual retirement benefit 
awarded to the Petitioner, or approximately $6,500.00 per year or 
$541.66 per month, upon the Petitioner's retirement from full-time 
employment. 
15. The court finds that, were the Petitioner to retire from his employment with 
the State of Utah and were Respondent to receive Social Security 
6 
retirement benefits and her portion of the Petitioner's retirement, the 
Respondent would be in a significantly better economic position than she 
is at the present time, receiving Social Security disability benefits and 
alimony from the Petitioner in the sum of $200.00 per month. 
16. The Petitioner has not retired from his employment, to date, despite his 
eligibility to do so, because he alleges he is concerned that the obligation 
to pay alimony will continue past his retirement, and he is concerned that 
he will be unable to meet his expenses on a reduced income from 
retirement, if the alimony obligation continues. This was the Petitioner's 
stated purpose for bringing his petition to modify the alimony obligation to 
terminate that obligation. 
17. The Petitioner is employed by the State of Utah Division of Child and 
Family Services as a social worker. His gross annual income is 
approximately $40,000.00, or $3,333.33 per month. From this is withheld 
federal and state taxes of approximately $848.00, and his net income is 
$2,485.33 per month. 
18. In addition to the foregoing income from his employment, the Petitioner 
has requested and has begun to receive Social Security retirement 
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benefits by reason of his having achieved his 65th birthday, and those 
benefits are paid to him in the sum of approximately $1,250 00 per month 
19 The Petitioner has reasonable and necessary monthly living expenses as 
follows 
Rent/Mortgage 
Property Taxes 
Insurance 
Maintenance 
Food/Supplies 
Utilities (water/gasy 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
i 
electric/heat $ 
Telephone $ 
Laundry/Dry Clean $ 
Clothing $ 
Medical and Dental $ 
Medical Insurance 
Life Insurance 
Union Dues 
Entertainment 
Incidentals 
Auto expenses 
Installments 
Other expenses 
Other expenses 
Attorney's fees 
. EXPENSES 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
400 00 to amortize the loan or $280 00 to pay 
interest only 
110 00 
45 00 
100 00 
460 00 
150 00 
55 00 
10 00 
50 00 
125 00 
30 00 
35 00 
14 00 
100 00 
100 00 
250 00 
$1,176 00 
$ 
$ 
$ 
200 00 (alimony) 
380 00 (missionary cost for son on mission) 
150 00 
$3,940 00 
20 The Respondent's refusal to waive further alimony in this case, in order to 
induce the Petitioner to retire so that she can receive his retirement 
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benefits, which are greater than the alimony, is not reasonable in the 
premises. However, the court cannot require the parties to behave 
reasonably in settlement discussions. 
21. Each party to this action has incurred substantial attorney's fees, and 
each party should be ordered to pay and assume his or her own court 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in this action. 
22. Petitioner has requested that this court order that alimony terminate after 
the duration of the parties' marriage, given the adoption of new statutory 
law generally limiting the duration of alimony to the length of a marriage. 
The court declined to grant this request. 
23. The court did not order initially that alimony would terminate upon the 
Petitioner's retirement, or at any other time, other than the Petitioner's 
death or Respondent's death, remarriage or cohabitation, and from this, 
this court concludes that the trial court originally did not intend alimony 
ever to terminate. 
BASED UPON the foregoing and for good cause appearing the court now makes 
and enters the following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter to this action and over 
the parties to this action 
2. There has not been a substantial and material change in circumstances 
warranting a modification of alimony 
3. The Petitioner does not come to this court with clean hands, and is 
therefore not entitled to the relief which he is seeking 
4. The court should not modify the duration of the alimony, to terminate after 
the duration of the parties' marriage 
ORDER 
BASED UPON the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and for good 
cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
The Petitioner's petition to modify the decree of divorce is hereby dismissed, 
each party to pay and assume his or her own court costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
this action 
10 
DATED THIS IK day of i/UfU,^* 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
STEPHEN L. HEN 
District Court 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be mailed to: 
NATHAN PACE 
Attorney for Respondent 
136 South Main, #404 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
on this ( day of 2001. 
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EXHIBIT "B 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF UTAH FILED 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
— o o o o o — APR 2 8 2003 
PAT BARTHOLOMEW 
Rae Adamson, CLERK OF THE COURT 
Petitioner, 
v. No. 20030108-SC 
20010516-CA 
Ranae Adamson, 874904654 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court on a petition for writ of 
certiorari, filed on February 10, 2003. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the petition for writ of certiorari is 
granted as to the second issue presented only: Whether the court 
of appeals erred in holding the issue presented in the petition 
for modification of alimony was not ripe for adjudication. 
Upon receipt of the record in the above case from the Utah 
Court of Appeals, parties will be notified as to the briefing 
schedule. 
For The Court; 
>ted /%mU$> ?m *? Dat  //J//\VV  ,7)0 SW V ^{ty/xffm/l fj , V f e ^ ^ / ^ V 
Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on April 28, 2003, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the party(ies) listed below: 
MARY C. CORPORON 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS PC 
808 E S TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102-1305 
NATHAN D. PACE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
136 S MAIN ST STE 404 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand 
delivered to a personal representative of the court(s) listed 
below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: SOPHIE ORVIN /KATHY SHUPE 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 18 60 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
PAULETTE STAGG 
COURT OF APPEALS 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230 
By _ 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 20030108-SC 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 874904654 
'
nQ;. ?0g tidfr 
EXHIBIT "C 
HLED DISTRICT COUHT 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 Third Judicial District 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 323-1162 By. 
MAR 2 0 1989 
' 3 A . p-AKE COUNTY 
Owpufy Ci«rt 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CCJRT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
RAE ADAMSON, ^ 1 U J ^ ^ 
Plaintiff, DECREE OF DIVORCE 
-vs- Civil No. D87-4654 
RANAE ADAMSON, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before 
the above-entitled court on Thursday, the 9th day of February/ 
1989, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge presiding; the 
plaintiff appearing in person and by and through counsel, Mary C. 
Corporon, and the defendant appearing in person and by and 
through counsel, Jeffrey C. Hunt, the Court having heard the 
sworn testimony of the parties and their witnesses and the 
arguments of counsel, and the Court having reviewed the file and 
the pleadings contained therein; based thereon, the Court being 
fully advised in the premises and more than 90 days having 
elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this action, and the 
Court and having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, now, therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintirf is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce, 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the 
parties, the same to become final and effective immediately upon 
being signed by the Judge and entered by the clerk in the 
register of actions. 
2. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the permanent care, custody 
and control of the minor children of the parties, Shandrae and 
Tracy* 
3. Defendant is hereby awarded visitation weekly witli the 
minor children, with the exact times and dates to be arranged 
directly between the defendant and the parties' children, taking 
into consideration the Court's recommendation that this 
visitation occur either on a Saturday or on a Sunday. In 
addition, defendant is awarded visitation with the minor children 
on alternate state and federal holidays, on her birthday, and on 
the children's birthd'.y, as she may arrange between herself and 
the children. Further, defendant is awarded reasonable and 
liberal telephone access with the minor children. The 
defendant's visitation with the children shall be unsupervised; 
however, in the event that the defendant should be intoxicated at 
the commencement of the visitation or become so during the course 
of the visitation, the children shall not be required to visit 
with the defendant on that occasion, 
4. Plaintiff is ordered to maintain health and accident 
insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children of the 
parties, as it is available to him through his employment. 
5. Plaintiff, defendant and the parties' minor children, 
are hereby ordered to submit: to counseling with a qualified 
2 
family therapist, either through Salt Lake County Mental Health, 
the Utah State Department of Social Services, or another 
qualified counselor or therapist, for purposes of resolving the 
cc .flict between the defendant and the minor children of the 
pe ties . 
6. Plaintiff is heresy awarded the truck, free and clear of 
a: interest of the defendant and defendant is hereby awarded the 
Fc:d Granada, free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff-
7. Plaintiff is ordered to pay and assume all debts and 
o igations incurred by che parties until the date of the divorce 
h rein, including, specifically, any debt incurred by defendant 
t r her living accommodations. 
3. T'ie parties' previous division of their items of 
ersonal effects, jewelry, clothing and belongings, and household 
.rnishings, fixtures and appliances is hereby confirmed in each 
id each party is awarded those items currently in his or her own 
:ssession, with the exception of the following items, which are 
ereby awarded to the defendant: the grandfather clock, one set 
: bathroom linens, her sister's couch, a reasonable portion of 
~a tableware, pors and pans and bedroom linens, and the casual 
ole and chairs. 
9. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the permanent use rand 
p ssession of the real property of the parties located at 4195 
S uth 1865 East in Salt Lake City, State of Utah, and all right, 
title and .interest therein, including the right to any reserve 
cccnnnt, ir-ie and clear of any interest of the defendant, subject 
to "*ie first and second mortgage indebtedness owing thereon, 
which plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay and assume and hold 
3 
defendant harmless thereon. Defendant is hereby ordered to 
execute a Quit-Claim Deed, quit-claiming all interest she may 
0O<0 Us* . 
have in said real property to the plaintiffJ Further, defendant 
is hereby awarded a non-interest bearing equitable lien on said 
real property, in the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), 
representing her one-half share of the equity in the real 
property, payable upon the first to occur of the following 
events: 
a. plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation in the home 
with woman other than the defendant; 
b. the youngest child of the parties attaining the age 
of 18 years or graduating from high school in due course, 
whichever last occurs; 
c. the death of the plaintiff; 
d. the sale of the real property at plaintiff's 
election; 
e. plaintiff's ceasing to use said real property as 
his primary place of residence, 
10. Plaintiff's retirement plan through his employment with 
the State of Utah, is ordered to be divided between the parties, 
according to the Woodward formula, and a Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order shall issue from this Court. 
11. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to defendant the sum 
of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, as and for alimony, 
commencing with the month of February 1989, and continuing until 
the death of the plaintiff or defendant, until defendant's 
remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first occurs, or until 
further order of this Court. This award of alimony is subject to 
4 
review by this Court on July 7, 1989 at 8:30 a.m., before the 
assigned judge. 
12. Defendant is hereby ordered to pursue all employment 
c oortunities and all job training opportunities available to her 
a set forth in the Findings of Fact entered by this Court. 
F rther, defendant is ordered to make a reasonable and concerted 
e fort to obtain employment, including making contacts through 
b Service, private employment agencies, and making a minimum of 
i^ree applications for employment per week with prospective 
uployers and is ordered to report her job search efforts to this 
:ourt at the hearing on July 7, 1989. 
13. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum 
of Seventy-Five Dollars ($75.00) per month, per child, commencing 
with the month of February 1989 and continuing until such time as 
the minor children achieve the age of 18 years or graduate from 
high school in the normal course of their high school educations, 
whichever event occurs later. In any month when the defendant 
fails to make an actual monetary payment to plaintiff for child 
support, said child support shall be deducted from defendant's 
lien on the marital residence of the parties. 
In the event the defendant falls 30 or more days in arrears 
in her child support obligation, the plaintiff shall be entitled 
to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. seq. (Supp. 1988). 
14. Each party is ordered to pay and assume his or her own 
court costs and attorney's fees. 
15. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all 
necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the 
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JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
Appellant Rae Adamson (Husband) appeals the trial court's 
denial of his petition to modify the divorce decree and terminate 
alimony. Husband alleged a substantial and material change in 
circumstances, namely, his contemplated future retirement. 
Husband had not actually retired, nor has he yet retired. 
"This issue is . . . inappropriate for appellate review 
because it is not ripe. Ripeness occurs when 'a conflict over 
the application of a legal provision [has] sharpened into an 
actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between 
the parties thereto.'" Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P.2d 741, 744 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (alteration in original) (quoting Redwood 
Gvm v. Salt Lake City Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1148 (Utah 1981)). 
No "'actual or imminent clash of legal rights'" exists here 
because Husband's employment status has not in fact changed. Id. 
Husband asks us to modify his alimony payments based upon his 
prospective retirement. 
Husband argues in his reply brief that his retirement is not 
merely speculative, but is in fact imminent because it is a 
matter of choice and because he is old enough to retire. 
However, if Husband's alimony were terminated by a court ruling, 
the ruling could not compel him to actually retire. He has to 
make his own retirement decision. Until he does, Husband has no 
argument that there is a substantial and material change 
entitling him to a modification or termination of alimony. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) (g) (i) (Supp. 2001) (allowing trial 
court to modify alimony based upon a finding of "substantial 
material change in circumstances"). Husband's entitlement to 
retire does not guarantee that he will in fact retire. 
Husband further argues that the real issue, which is ripe 
for appellate review, is the harm he presently suffers from being 
unable both to retire and to continue paying alimony. However, 
alimony modification is not a question of harm.1 Rather, there 
is a threshold question: Has there been a substantial and 
material change in the petitioner's circumstances? See id. Thus 
far, Husband has established no basis to modify or terminate 
alimony within the contemplation of section 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). 
Accordingly, we conclude that Husband's petition is not ripe 
for judicial determination. We affirm the trial court's 
conclusion that " [t]here has not been a substantial and material 
change in circumstances warranting a modification of alimony."2 
Further, Wife's claim for attorney fees on appeal is denied. 
Norm: 
Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
1. Husband provides no legal authority, nor are we aware of any, 
allowing modification of alimony based on the "harm" suffered by 
an inability to simultaneously retire and continue paying 
alimony. 
2. We do not address the trial court's additional conclusions 
regarding whether the original alimony award contemplated 
Husband's retirement. Our affirmance of the trial court's denial 
of Husband's petition is limited to our conclusion that because 
Husband has not in fact retired, he presents no issue ripe for 
judicial determination. The trial court's further conclusions 
regarding the substance of Husband's petition were not necessary. 
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